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Abstract—Deep Learning models hold state-of-the-art perfor-
mance in many fields, but their vulnerability to adversarial
examples poses a threat to their ubiquitous deployment in
practical settings. Additionally, adversarial inputs generated on
one classifier have been shown to transfer to other classifiers
trained on similar data, which makes the attacks possible even
if the model parameters are not revealed to the adversary. This
property of transferability has not yet been systematically studied,
leading to a gap in our understanding of robustness of neural
networks to adversarial inputs. In this work, we study the
effect of network architecture, initialization, input, weight and
activation quantization on transferability. Our experiments reveal
that transferability is significantly hampered by input quantiza-
tion and architectural mismatch between source and target, is
unaffected by initialization and is architecture-dependent for both
weight and activation quantization. To quantify transferability,
we propose a simple metric, which is a function of the attack
strength. We demonstrate the utility of the proposed metric in
designing a methodology to build ensembles with improved adver-
sarial robustness. Finally, we show that an ensemble consisting
of carefully chosen input quantized networks achieves better
adversarial robustness than would otherwise be possible with
a single network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep learning has become state-of-the-art for many machine
learning tasks over the past few years. Deep neural networks
(DNNs) have achieved human level performance in image
recognition [1], [2]. They have also been used for speech
recognition [3] and natural language processing [4]. However,
recent research [5], [6], [7] has shown the existence of small
perturbations which when added to the input can cause DNNs
to misclassify the input. These adversarial perturbations are
imperceptible to the human eye and are crafted with the specific
intent of fooling deep neural networks into misclassifying
the images. The existence of adversarial inputs has led to a
considerable knowledge gap in the explainability of deep neural
nets, which limits their use in safety critical applications such
as malware detection [8] or autonomous driving systems [9].
The generation of adversarial inputs usually requires access
to the target network (the network to be attacked) in the form of
network weights or logits. However, in most practical scenarios,
the adversary does not have access to the internal parameters,
but is able to observe the output of the network for a given
input [10]. In such cases, previous works [11], [12], [13] have
shown that the adversary can train a substitute network by
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generating synthetic data using the outputs or the logits of
the target network. Such query based attacks, often labeled as
black-box attacks, are successful because of the transferability
of adversarial perturbations: attacks crafted to fool one network
often fool another network trained on similar data.
In this paper, with the motive of understanding the trans-
ferability of adversarial images between networks, we sys-
tematically study how transferability is affected by network
architecture, network initialization, input, weight and activation
quantization. To account for these factors, we propose a
metric of transferability as a function of the attack strength.
Additionally, we show that understanding transferability aids
in building robust ensembles of DNNs.
The key contributions of this work are summarised as
follows:
• We explore the effect of network initialization, model
architecture, quantization of input, weight and activation
on transferability of adversarial images from one DNN
to another. We also make empirical suggestions on the
most effective model to use, both from the point of view
of an adversary and defender. These experiments were
performed on various small and large datasets, attacked
using PGD [14]. Additionally, we study the effect of attack
strength () on transferability;
• We fit the number of images that transfer from one model
to another as the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF)
of an exponential distribution. Using this, we propose a
simple metric of transferability as a function of attack
strength (), that can be estimated with as few as 4
empirical datapoints and generalizes to a continuum of
epsilons;
• We devise an effective method for adversarially attacking
an ensemble of DNNs;
• We outline a methodology, TREND (Transferability based
Robust ENsemble Design), which uses the proposed
transferability metric to build an ensemble with higher
robustness than would otherwise be possible with a single
DNN.
II. RELATED WORK
Attack Methodologies. Many methods have been proposed
for generating adversarial inputs. Some of the popular attacks
in literature are Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [6], a
single step attack; Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [7], a multi-
step iterative attack; Carlini Wagner Attack (CW) [15], an
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2optimization based attack; and Projected Gradient Descent
(PGD)[14], an iterative version of FGSM with a random start
point within an  bound around the clean image. There are
numerous other attacks like Jacobian-based Saliency Map
Attack (JSMA) [16], DeepFool [17], and Elastic-Net Attacks
(EADAttack) [18]. However, PGD is currently the strongest
known attack, and therefore, we study transferability under
this attack. We utilize Back-Propagation through Differential
Approximation (BPDA) [19] style gradient back-propagation
to allow gradients to propagate through any non-differentiable
functions such as input or activation quantization, wherever
needed.
Transferability. The ability of adversarial perturbations
generated on one model to successfully fool other models was
first observed in [5] and subsequently in [6]. It has been shown
that transferability is not unique to deep learning, but exists
across various machine learning classifiers [20]. They show
transferability across DNNs, k-Nearest Neighbors, Decision
Trees, Support Vector Machines and Logistic Regression.
Such transfer attacks can be implemented successfully in
both targeted or non-targeted scenarios [21]. Moreover, the
transferability of adversarial examples is hypothesized to occur
due to the alignment of the decision boundaries across various
models [21]. The adversarial examples are shown to span a
contiguous subspace of high dimensionality (≈25) [22] . The
authors find that a significant factor of this subspace is shared
between two models, which they attribute to the closeness
of the decision boundaries learnt by the models. However,
authors of [23] argue that the transfer is asymmetric and hence,
cannot be explained completely by closely aligned decision
boundaries.
Ensembles. Ensemble methods leverage the averaging ef-
fects of multiple models to make a final prediction. Model
averaging methods include bagging [24] and boosting [25], [26].
We consider one of the simplest approaches to make decisions:
the majority voting strategy. Ensembles are used as a tool to
reduce variance in classifiers [27]. However, we utilize them to
gain adversarial robustness without significantly degrading the
performance on clean images. Recent research [28], [29], [30]
has focused on developing defense strategies using ensembles.
However, it has been shown [31] that ensembles are not immune
to adversarial attacks. In this paper, we take a deeper look at
the link between transferability and the adversarial accuracy
of ensembles, first suggested in [31]. We show that careful
selection of individual DNNs that make up the ensemble can
improve the overall robustness of the ensemble.
III. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section, we perform experiments to study how network
initialization, network architecture, input, weight and activation
quantization affect transferability. We study the effect of these
factors independently on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 [32] and
ImageNet [33] datasets.
All the models in the paper were trained using the stochastic
gradient descent optimizer with a momentum of 0.9 and weight
decay of 5× 10−4. The models were trained for 250 epochs
on the ImageNet dataset and 350 epochs on CIFAR-10 and
CIFAR100 datasets. Initial learning rate was set to 10−2 and it
was scaled down by a factor of 10 at 60% and 80% completion
using a learning rate scheduler. At the end of each epoch
the model was evaluated on the validation set and the model
weights that achieved the best validation accuracy was saved.
The model weights that achieved the best validation accuracy
was used to evaluate the network performance on the test
set and its accuracy was reported. Table I shows the training,
validation and test set sizes for each dataset used.
Preliminaries. Let the input to a DNN be represented by x,
its true class be denoted by t, and the neural net classifier
be represented by the function f(x). Then x′ = x + δ,
where − ≤ δ ≤ , is said to be an adversarial input to
the network if f(x) = t and f(x′) 6= t. Here,  represents
the maximum allowed perturbation with respect to a distance
metric, generally L∞, L2 or L0 norm. The norm is given by
||x||p = (Σni=1|xi|p)(1/p) where p = 0 for L0, p = 2 for L2
and so on. Images are considered adversarial if the changes
are imperceptible to humans but fool the network. To limit
the allowable change, bounds are set on the perturbation norm
to maintain imperceptibility. We consider the L∞ distance
between the original and the perturbed image as the measure
of change.
Transferability. We study transferability between models
by generating adversarial images on the source model and
evaluating them on the target model. To generate the adversarial
images, we run PGD for 40 iterations with an  of 8/255 and
step size of 0.01, unless otherwise mentioned. An image is
considered to transfer to the target model if the clean image is
classified correctly by both the source and the target model and
the adversarial image is misclassified by both the models. To
decouple the effect of accuracy of the source and target models,
we run our experiments on a subset of 1000 images that are
correctly classified by all the models under consideration.
Confusion Matrices. We present results as a confusion
matrix which represents the number of images transferred as
a fraction of the subset size (1000). Hence a value of 0.14
translates to 140 adversarial images transferred from source
to target, out of the 1000 generated on the source. The deeper
the color of the cell, the higher the transferability between
the corresponding source and target model. The normalized
transferability number can also be viewed as the factor with
which the adversarial accuracy of the black box model is
expected to decrease. The rows and columns represent the effect
of changing the target model or the source model, respectively.
An adversary performing black box attacks has control over
only the source model and would want to choose a model with
the highest row average, in order to successfully attack a range
of target models. Similarly, a defender controls only the target
model and would want to choose the model with the lowest
column average, in order to have the lowest transferability
across any chosen source model. The averages are therefore
shown alongside the corresponding rows and columns. The
confusion matrices for CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and ImageNet
are shown in Blue, Green and Orange respectively.
3TABLE I: Training, Validation and Test set sizes for the datasets used
Dataset Train Set Size Validation Set Size Test Set Size
CIFAR-10 45,000 (90%) 5,000 (10%) 10,000
CIFAR-100 45,000 (90%) 5,000 (10%) 10,000
ImageNet 1,249,137 (97.5%) 32,029 (2.5%) 50,000
TABLE II: Baseline model accuracies in % and the number of images transferred from source to target on CIFAR-10 and
CIFAR-100 datasets for differently seeded models.
Architecture CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100
Seed 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
ResNet18
Acc 91.85 92.04 91.91 92.53 Acc 72.56 72.80 72.61 72.48
Trans. 1000 509 534 566 Trans. 1000 707 688 648
VGG11
Acc 87.21 88.20 87.57 87.41 Acc 55.5 56.87 56.56 55.80
Trans. 1000 717 760 709 Trans. 1000 638 682 637
VGG11 BN
Acc 87.66 87.76 87.97 88.11 Acc 60.07 60.29 60.22 60.40
Trans. 1000 695 697 655 Trans. 1000 468 446 436
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Fig. 1: Number of adversarial images transferred from source to target for various architectures.
IV. TRANSFERABILITY ANALYSIS
A. Network Initialization
The gradient descent algorithm is known to be sensitive
to initialization [34]. Different parameter initializations lead
training to converge to different solutions [35]. We investigate
the effect of initialization by training four models with different
random initial seeds. In this study we consider ResNet18 [36],
VGG11 and the batch normalized version of VGG11 (VGG11
BN) [37] architectures.
Table II shows the baseline accuracies and the number
of adversarial images transferred from the source to the
target model under PGD attack. The source model for each
architecture was initialized with ‘Seed 1’. We highlight in
blue the case where the source and the target models are
identical and the number of images transferred represents the
number of adversarial images generated on that particular
model. We observe that the number of images transferred does
not radically change across different seeds, for all the models.
This suggests that initialization does not play a significant
role in transferability. Table II also seems to imply that
architecture is an important consideration for transferability.
We investigate this in the next subsection.
B. Architecture
We study the effect of architecture on transferability by
analyzing cross model transfer of adversarial images between
ResNet18 (RN18), ResNet34 (RN34), ResNet101 (RN101),
VGG11, VGG19, VGG11BN, VGG19BN, DenseNet121
(DN121) [38] and WideResNet50 2 (WRN50 2) [39]. Figure
1 shows the number of adversarial images transferred from
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Fig. 2: Number of adversarial images transferred from source to target for input quantized models.
source to target for various architectures on CIFAR-10 and
ImageNet (see Appendix II for CIFAR-100 results).
Figure 1a can be interpreted by analyzing the 4 quadrants,
with each quadrant representing a family of source or target
model architectures (ResNet or VGG variants). The top
right quadrant of Figure 1a is lighter than the bottom left
quadrant. This implies that adversarial images generated on
VGG are more transferable to ResNets than the other way
around. The results for CIFAR-100 follow the same trend
and are shown Appendix II. Surprisingly, we find that the
matrices are considerably asymmetric. These findings reveal
that transferability is not commutative. Another empirical
observation is that the left half of Figure 1a is the darkest,
implying that ResNets are more susceptible to transfer attacks.
This susceptibility has been leveraged to build better transfer
attacks [40] and is attributed to skip connections [40]. These
trends also hold for ImageNet. From Figure 1, we observe that
the column averages for ResNet18, ResNet34, VGG11 and
VGG19 are among the highest. The high column average for
VGG networks can be attributed to intra-family transferability,
with just two numbers boosting up the column average. Hence,
VGG models are better source models for the adversary
because the row averages for VGG networks are consistently
high across various datasets and provides the highest chances
for successful black-box attacks. ResNets are easier targets
and should therefore be avoided by defenders, as they
consistently show very high column averages across various
datasets.
C. Quantization
Recent research [29], [30], [41] suggests that quantization
has potential to provide robustness against adversarial images.
We expect these trends to be applicable to transferability as
well. Therefore, we study how input, weight and activation
quantization affect transferability. For all experiments hence-
forth, our base model is ResNet18. Results for VGG11 as the
base model are presented in Appendix III and IV.
1) Input Quantization: Input quantization as the name
suggests, quantizes the input to the network. We analyze various
input bit widths ranging from 8-bits down to 1-bit per channel,
per pixel for both the source and the target models.
We quantize a minibatch of images using the following
formula,
Iquant =
⌊
I − imin
b
⌋
b +
(
1
2
b + imin
)
(1)
where Iquant is the quantized minibatch of images, b is the
bin width defined as
b =
imax − imin
2n
(2)
where n is the bit-width used for input quantization, imin is
the minimum and imax is the maximum value of the minibatch
I . This scheme is similar to the one suggested by [40], the
difference being, we normalize the input before quantization.
The inputs were normalized using the mean and standard
deviation of the training dataset. We also consider the non-
linear quantization scheme of halftoning mentioned in [42]. The
quantized models are represented by ”Q¡bit-width¿”, halftone
by ”HT” and ”FP” refers to the full precision network. We
use BPDA [19] based gradient backpropagation through the
quantization scheme. The baseline accuracies of models trained
on different input bit-widths are presented in the Appendix
I. From Figures 2a and 2b (see Appendix III for CIFAR100
results), we see that low bit width input quantized models
(HT, Q1 and Q2) have very low transferability. Additionally,
transferability of input quantized models is highly asymmetric.
It is far easier to transfer from Q2 to various models than
it is to transfer to Q2. This is also true for Q4 and HT,
though to a lesser extent. To further understand the effect
of input quantization, we visualize the decision boundaries of
the network. The basis (i.e. x and y axes) of the visualization
5(a) Image (b) Decision Boundary for FP (c) Decision Boundary for Q1
Fig. 3: Decision boundaries around image 3a the of a full precision and 1-bit quantized input model
shown in Figure 3 were chosen to be the normalized adversarial
gradient vector obtained from PGD (x-axis) and a random
vector orthogonal to the former. Using these two vectors as
the basis, the input space was traversed and the corresponding
classes represented with different colors. The centers of Figures
3b and 3c represent 3a in the input space. We observe that
input quantization increases the distance to the decision
boundary in most directions, however, transfer attacks still
successfully find adversarial examples.
This leads us to conclude that low bit width input quanti-
zation significantly reduces the success of transfer attacks.
For instance, quantizing the inputs of CIFAR-10 from FP to Q1
improves adversarial accuracy by ∼ 9% between Q1 and FP.
Input quantized models with bit width greater than 2 make
better source models for adversaries. This is because these
models have high row averages (see Figure 2) which results in
the highest chance for a successful black-box transfer attack.
Input quantized models with bit widths 1, 2 or HT are
more robust to transfer attacks, and hence make better
target models for the defenders. This is clear from the low
column averages (see Figure 2) for these models across various
datasets, provide the best chance of defense.
2) Weight and Activation Quantization: In this subsection,
we study how quantizing the network parameters and activations
affect the number of images transferred. Figure 4 shows the
transferability among ResNet18 models with different weight
and activation bit precisions for CIFAR-10 (see Appendix
IV for CIFAR-100 results). The weight quantized models are
represented by ”W¡bit-width¿”, activation quantized models
are represented by ”A¡bit-width¿” and ”FP” represents 32-bit
full precision model. Results for VGG weight and activation
quantized models are available in Appendix IV. We find that
the trends for activation and weight quantization are highly
dataset and architecture dependent. It is difficult to make generic
recommendations for the adversary or the defender. We show
the confusion matrices for different datasets and architectures
in Appendix IV, and the relevant ones can be consulted when
making a decision.
D. Transferability Metric
The previous subsections show that transferability is affected
by a multitude of factors. In this subsection, we analyze the
variation of transferability with respect to the attack strength .
We plot the number of images that transfer between different
source-target models, referred to as fst(), for 20 different
values of  in Fig. 5. We observe that these curves cross
one another and therefore the trends of transferability across
models cannot be generalized from the observations at a single .
However, we are interested in plotting this curve with the fewest
possible measurements, such that it would have good predictive
power over a range of  values. To do this, we note that each
plot visually resembles the CDF of an exponential distribution.
The same is true for the number of images generated on a
model, denoted by fss. Hence, we characterize both functions
in the following form:
fst() = a(1− eb) (3)
fss() = a
′(1− eb′) (4)
where a, a′, b and b′ are the parameters for fitting the data,
obtained experimentally. We find the parameters of the equation
using a few datapoints. Figure 5 shows the empirical curve
obtained using 20 points, and the predicted curve, fit using
4 points. We observe that they align well and we get ¡ 5%
Root Mean Square Error(RMSE) for the fit. Table III shows
the standard error (RMSE) for the fit used to calculate the
transferability metric.
TABLE III: Transferability Metric Fit Confidence for CIFAR10
Source Model Target Model Standard Error Standard ErrorTrain (RMSE) Test (RMSE)
VGG11 VGG11 114.41 505.23
RESNET18 RESNET18 38.67 480.64
VGG11 RESNET18 661.34 516.65
RESNET18 VGG11 44.58 46.72
VGG11 Seed1 VGG11 Seed2 529.92 405.56
RESNET18 Seed1 RESNET18 Seed2 358.37 248.17
FP Q1 12.63 47.11
Q1 FP 352.34 423.61
Armed with these observations, we propose a simple but
effective transferability metric that quantifies transferability
as a function of attack strength . In the previous subsection
we capture transferability as a ratio of the number of images
that transfer to the target to the number of images that were
generated at the source. Equivalently our generative model
of transferability normalizes fst by fss and gives us the
transferability metric, TM:
TM() =
fst()
fss()
(5)
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Fig. 4: Number of adversarial images transferred from source to target on CIFAR-10 dataset.
The transferability metric is a number between [0, 1] and
represents a quantitative measure of the transferability between
a given pair of models. The constants in both equations capture
the effects of dataset, architecture, input quantization etc. and
can be estimated with a few datapoints. For example, we use
4 datapoints to estimate the constants for various quantizations
for CIFAR-10. The predicted values are shown in Figure 6
and the experimentally obtained values are shown in Figure
2a. The close match between Figure 6 and 2a shows the
effectiveness of the proposed transferability metric in predicting
adversarial input transferability. The average difference between
the predicted and actual values is 0.055 or 5.5% for CIFAR-10
dataset on ResNet18 base model. Results for CIFAR-100 are
presented in Appendix V and reflect a good match between
the predicted and simulated values.
V. ASSEMBLING THE RIGHT ENSEMBLE
Recent research [28], [29], [30] suggests that ensembles
provide robustness against adversarial attacks. The robustness
of the ensemble, or the lack thereof, is hypothesized to arise
from the property of transferability [31]. Since images are
transferable to different models, an image meant to fool one
network will fool a majority of the networks in the ensemble
and therefore, the whole ensemble. We delve deeper into
this hypothesis by constructing ensembles with models that
have varying transferability between them, as captured by the
transferability metric proposed in Subsection IV-D. We expect
ensembles with models that have a high transferability metric
(averaged by exchanging the source and target) between them
to be less robust, as an image that fools one model will transfer
well and fool the ensemble. We can assemble ensembles of
any order by choosing pairs of models with low transferability
metric among them, resulting in an ensemble with improved
robustness. In the subsequent sections, we go into the details
of how to effectively attack and design ensembles.
A. Attacking an Ensemble
Optimization based attacks like PGD use the gradient of the
input with respect to the loss function to decide the direction of
change. However, the choice of gradient direction is not easily
apparent for an ensemble. The simplest way is to average
the gradient [43] from each model. This is referred to as
the Gradient Average attack. However, the gradients from
different models in an ensemble tend to cancel each other out,
especially when the attack strength is low. Hence, we devise
more effective ways to generate the gradient direction for an
ensemble. The first method, which we call Sign All chooses
only those gradient directions where all the individual models’
gradient directions align. The second method, or Sign Average,
calculates the gradient direction for the ensemble by averaging
the sign of the gradients from each model.
Sign All. In this approach gradient direction for the ensemble
as a whole is given by
sgn(Gensemble) =
{
x x = y : x, y ∈ Si, Sj ∀ i 6= j; i, j ∈ [1, N ]
0 otherwise
(6)
where sgn is the signum or sign function, Si = sgn(Gi) is
the sign of the gradient from individual model i and N is the
number of models in the ensemble. Equation 6 translates to
choosing only those gradient directions where all the individual
model’s gradient directions are in agreement.
Sign Average. In this approach, the gradient direction for the
ensemble is calculated by averaging the sign of the gradients
from each model.
sgn(Gensemble) =
1
N
N∑
m=1
sgn(Gm) (7)
where sgn is the sign function, Gm is the gradient from an
individual model m and N is the number of models in the
ensemble.
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at  of 8/255, obtained from equation 5, fit using 4 datapoints.
The empirical counterpart is found in Fig 8b
Sign Average is significantly more effective than Gradient
Average because it acts only on the signs of the individual
gradient and thus avoids confusion because of the magnitudes.
Figure 7 shows the results for the Gradient Average, Sign All
and Sign Average attacks and it can be seen that Sign Average
performs significantly better than other approaches. We use
this attack for testing our ensembles in the subsequent sections.
B. Robust Ensemble Design
In this subsection, we utilize the transferability metric
introduced in Subsection IV-D to put forth a methodology
TREND, to build an ensemble with improved robustness. The
ensembles predicts a class using majority voting. In case of
conflict (i.e. no majority vote), one of the models is chosen
at random and its output is considered as the ensemble’s
prediction. The hypothesis that high transferability between
models in an ensemble results in reduced adversarial robustness
was first suggested in [31]. We leverage this idea and build
an ensemble with improved robustness by choosing models
with low transferability. To identify these models, we consider
a list of all pairs of individual models under consideration and
calculate the transferability metric for each pair. To account
for asymmetry, we average the two numbers obtained by
interchanging source and target. From this list, we choose a
desired number of models with the lowest transferability metric.
Figure 6 shows the transferability metric between various input
quantized configurations of ResNet18 trained on CIFAR-10.
The ensembles built using this method were evaluated using
the attacks described in Subsection V-A. From Figure 7 we
see that the ensemble of FP-Q1-Q2 consistently outperforms
other ensembles with respect to adversarial robustness. This
trend was expected from Figure 6, which predicts that Q1, Q2
and HT have the lowest average transferability metric. The
trend holds for different datasets, as shown in Appendix VI.
The Appendix VI also details various ensemble combinations
and their adversarial accuracies under attack, and the trends
expected from the transferability metric hold. Ensemble, FP-
Q1-Q2, designed using TREND is seen to be ¿ 25% more
robust than Q1, Q2 or FP individually. The improved robustness
is seen as an increase in L∞ perturbation needed to fool such
ensembles when compared to ensembles consisting of models
with high transferability as seen in Figure 7. The parameters
used for PGD were the same as in Section IV, except the
number of iterations was reduced to 20 to shorten the simulation
time.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
TREND is a methodology to systematically design an
ensemble with improved adversarial robustness. In this paper
we analyze the effect of DNN initialization, architecture, and
input, weight and activation quantization on transferability. Our
analysis suggests that initialization has no significant effect on
transferability, that the ResNet architecture is more susceptible
to transfer attacks than the other architectures considered and
quantizing the inputs significantly reduces transferability. The
reduction in transferability holds true only when the inputs are
quantized to low bit widths (one and two bits). Additionally,
our experiments reveal that the effect of weight and activation
quantization is highly dependent on the dataset. We also
observe that transferability is asymmetric. If adversarial images
transfer well from source to target, the vice versa need not
necessarily be true. Additionally, wherever applicable, we offer
guidelines for the construction of defense and attack models
based on the transferability trends observed. To account for
the effect of attack strength, epsilon, we propose a simple
transferability metric that can be estimated with very few
measurements and generalizes to a continuum of epsilons. The
constants that fit the distribution can be estimated with as little
as 4 experimental datapoints, and capture the dependencies
on all considered factors such as architecture, quantization
and initialization. We employ the transferability metric to
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Fig. 7: Accuracies in % of various ensembles as a function of attack strength  when using Gradient Average, Sign All and
Sign Average attack. From the plots, we see that models with low transferability form more robust ensembles.
design robust ensembles that require stronger attack strength
compared to the constituting models for a similar accuracy
degradation. Our results clarify that the adversarial robustness
of an ensemble is indeed determined by how transferable an
adversarial image is among the models in the ensemble. Using
the predicted values from the transferability metric, we are
able to construct ensembles with improved robustness.
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APPENDIX
I. BASELINE ACCURACIES
The baseline accuracies of the quantized models on different
datasets with base architecture ResNet18 and VGG11 are shown
in Table IV and V respectively. Baselines accuries for different
architecture are presented in Table VI
TABLE IV: Baseline model accuracies for quantized inputs,
weight and activations on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and ImageNet
with ResNet18 as baseline
Quantization CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100 ImageNet
FP 91.85% 72.56% 55.73%
Q8 92.52% 72.79% 55.63%
Q6 91.36% 72.15% 55.39%
Q4 91.42% 71.32% 55.09%
Q2 85.83% 62.21% 50.12%
Q1 75.80% 47.92% 40.27%
HT 84.44% 55.98% 46.95%
W16 91.85 % 71.91% -
W8 92.15% 72.63% -
W4 91.45% 66.63% -
W2 90.87% 63.2% -
W1 90.13% 56.77% -
A16 90.20% 65.95% -
A8 90.17% 66.62% -
A4 90.10% 67.01% -
A2 89.36% 61.49% -
A1 87.08% 57.73% -
TABLE V: Baseline model accuracies for quantized inputs,
weight and activations on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 with
VGG11 as baseline
Quantization CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100
FP 87.21% 55.50%
Q8 87.74% 56.58%
Q6 87.61% 55.24%
Q4 87.10% 54.50%
Q2 82.58% 50.44%
Q1 74.10% 37.88%
HT 80.74% 46.27%
W16 88.16% 56.58%
W8 88.16% 55.24%
W4 87.75% 54.50%
W2 86.82% 50.44%
A16 88.45% 57.33%
A8 88.15% 57.63%
A4 87.63% 41.12%
A2 87.00% 57.71%
A1 74.74% 32.76%
II. ARCHITECTURE ANALYSIS
Figure 8a shows the number of adversarial images transferred
from source to target for various architectures on CIFAR-100.
Figure 8a can be interpreted by analyzing the 4 quadrants,
with each quadrant representing a family of source or target
model architectures (ResNet or VGG variants). The top right
quadrant of Figure 8a is lighter than the bottom left quadrant.
This implies that adversarial images generated on VGG are
more transferable to ResNets than the other way around.
TABLE VI: Baseline model accuracies for different architec-
tures on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and ImageNet with ResNet18
as baseline
Quantization CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100 ImageNet
RN18 91.85% 72.56% 69.76%
RN34 92.16% 73.40% 73.31%
RN50 91.53% 69.37% -
RN101 92.83% 70.47% 77.37%
VGG11 87.21% 55.5% 69.02%
VGG19 88.29% 59.07% 72.38%
VGG11BN 87.66% 60.07% -
VGG19BN 89.83% 62.10% -
DN121 - - 74.43%
WRN50 2 - - 78.47%
III. INPUT QUANTIZATION
Figure 8b, Figure 9a and Figure 9b show the variation in
transferability due input quantization on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-
100 with ResNet and VGG as the base models.
IV. WEIGHT AND ACTIVATION QUANTIZATION
Figure 10 shows the confusion matrices for activation and
weight quantized models on CIFAR-100. Figure 11 shows
the confusion matrices for activation and weight quantized
VGG11 models on CIFAR-10. Figure 10a and Figure 10b use
ResNet18 as their base models while Figure 10c and Figure
10d use VGG11 as their base model.
V. TM FOR DIFFERENT DATASETS
Figure 12 presents the observed transferability metric for
input quantized networks and Figure 13 shows the error in
the predicted and observed values of transferability metric
for CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 datasets. Figure 14 shows the
observed transferability metric and the prediction error for
input quantized networks.
VI. RESULTS FOR DIFFERRENT ENSEMBLES
From Figure 13 and 14b we observe that Q1, Q2 and HT
are robust models for CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and ImageNet
datasets. The result for ensemble on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100
under different attacks are shown in Figure 15.
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Fig. 9: Number of adversarial images transferred from source to target on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 dataset
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(a) Activation quantized ResNet18 models
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(b) Weight quantized ResNet18 models
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(c) Activation quantized VGG11 models
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Fig. 10: Number of adversarial images transferred from source to target on CIFAR-100 dataset (with Subset size of 3000)
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(a) Activation quantized VGG11 models
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(b) Weight quantized VGG11 models
Fig. 11: Number of adversarial images transferred from source to target on CIFAR-10 dataset
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Fig. 12: Actual TM and error in predictions for TM of quantized ResNet18 models at epsilon of 8/255 for CIFAR-10 dataset
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Fig. 13: Actual TM and error in predictions for TM of quantized ResNet18 models at epsilon of 8/255 for CIFAR-100 dataset
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Fig. 14: Actual TM and error in predictions for TM of quantized ResNet18 models at epsilon of 8/255 for ImageNet dataset
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(a) CIFAR-100 Gradient Average
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
0
20
40
60
80
100
Ac
cu
ra
cy
Epsilon
 FP-Q1
 FP-Q2
 Q1-HT
 FP-Q6
 FP-FP2
 FP-Q1-HT
 FP-Q1-Q2
 FP-Q6-Q8
(b) CIFAR-100 Sign All
Fig. 15: Results for ensembles under different attacks for CIFAR-100.
